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Of Laggards and Morons: Definitional Fluidity, Borderlinity, and the
Theory of Progressive Era Special Education (Part 1)
Benjamin Kelsey Kearl
methodological grist for the
history of education
Notes
Of Methods
This essay treats education biographically and uses special education as a way of discussing how
education generally defines itself. While education can be variously defined, this essay is less
concerned with definitions of education and more interested in how education, through its various
classificatory schemes, defines itself. In an essay that treats the school as trickster, Adrea Lawrence
discusses the plasticity of education and the ways that Native American schooling made schools
themselves into shape shifters, into contradictory spaces that morphed in relation to the Americanized
subjects they desired.1 “General” education is similarly contradictory and likewise shifts and morphs
1 Adrea Lawrence, “Our Trickster, The School,”
Education’s Histories, May 1, 2014, http://www.ed-
ucationshistories.org/trickster-school-part-1/.
through the use of classificatory schemes. Though scientific in description, special education
classifications have a beginning and change over time and thus mark the life history or biography of
education. Although biographies are traditionally of people, perhaps also of places, things, or ideas,
the biographical approach can also be applied to social institutions.
In employing biography as a method of inquiring, this essay argues that education’s life history is
Benjamin Kelsey Kearl is a Philosophy of Education doctoral candidate in the School of Education at Indiana University.
Benjamin is currently an Associate Instructor and Future Faculty Teaching Fellow in the College of Education and Public Policy
at Indiana University-Purdue University, Fort Wayne. He can be reached at bkearl@indiana.edu. The author would like to thank
Adrea Lawrence and Sara Clark for their helpful and insightful edits and suggestions.
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related to how special education classifies the subjects of education. This biography suggests that
special education is not something that “general” education does but is what education generally is.
To be sure, this methodology reifies education as a persona that acts on its own rather than as
something that is enacted by students, teachers, administrators, or policymakers. The language of
education defining itself is used here to draw attention to this reification and the ways that
classificatory schemes do more than define the subjects of education as this or that label.
Classificatory schemes also give education itself coherence as a subject. This methodological
implication is important given education’s desire for a theory of special education.
Part 1
A 1908 article published in the Journal of Psycho-Asthenics by Miss E. E. Farrell, Inspector of
Ungraded Classes of New York City, begins with a curious clarification:
The special classes in the public schools of the city of New York had their beginning in
Public School 1, Manhattan, in 1899. It is interesting to know that this class, which was
to demonstrate the need for further classification of children in public schools, was not
the result of any theory. It grew out of conditions in a neighborhood which furnished
many and serious problems in truancy and discipline. This first class was made up of the
odds and ends of a large school.22 E. E. Farrell, “Special Classes in the New York
City Schools,” Journal of Psycho-Asthenics, 13, nos.
1-4 (1908-09): 91.
Farrell’s insistence that while New York City’s special classes were “not the result of any theory,”
they would nonetheless demonstrate “the need for further classification of children” involves a
circular logic common to Progressive Era special education, a logic which insisted that the science of
classification only empirically validated the biological traits of those being classified and was thus
“not the result of any theory.” This logic makes Progressive Era special education appear as though
it emerged fully formed despite needing constant self-definition.
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Figure 1. Three ways of understanding the relationship between special and “general” education. Figure by author.
Graphic by Sara Clark.
The ways in which education defines itself through classificatory schemes is evident, for example, in
the replacement of the classification of idiocy by feeble-mindedness and the gradation of this latter
classification into low, medium, and high grades, each of which corresponded with a limit of
intelligence and a plateau of cognitive development. As Image 3 of Figure 1 above illustrates, these
limits and plateaus produce categorical spaces within education that work to define education
generally. These spaces are categorical both because they rely on classifications (categories) of
human difference and because, despite their allure of impermanence, they absolutely segregate
students according to indeterminately defined differences. Gradations, of course, require a way of
determining which bodies belong to which grades, which introduces the problems of definitional
fluidity and borderlinity.
In an effort to resolve these problems, experts established determinations predicated on mental age,
a concept newly derived from the cultural epoch conclusions of child studiers like G. Stanley Hall
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who argued that, despite being adult in appearance, those “savage” populations encountered through
Western colonialism were, in fact, cognitively childlike.3 This conclusion provided the intellectual3 See Bernadette Baker, “‘Childhood’ in the Emer-
gence and Spread of U.S. Public Schools,” in Fou-
cault’s Challenge: Discourse, Knowledge, and Power
in Education eds. Thomas S. Popkewitz and Marie
Brennan (New York: Teachers College Press, 1998):
123-37.
undergirding for the science of classification, which sought to make visible through the technology of
intelligence testing that which appearance might conceal; that is, experts who advanced the science
of classification were concerned with the possibility that individuals with retarded cognitive faculties
might pass as normal and thus put the general population at risk of diminished prosperity. It thus
became increasingly important to identify which bodies were feeble-minded and to define the
categorical spaces of normality and abnormality within education.
Such efforts were, of course, illusory, as definitional fluidity and borderlinity are necessary
requirements of any classificatory scheme. As each produces the necessary conditions for
classification to exist as a science, and each ensures that the shortcomings of any particular
classification do not undermine the science itself, but instead only warrant the need for greater
scientific accuracy. A difficulty with this warrant is that more science becomes the only way of
redressing bad science, a circular logic that easily allows for previous classifications to be forgotten
once they have been replaced by newer, more accurate ones. Contra this tendency, this essay seeks
to remember the classificatory schemes of Progressive Era special education as illustrative of how in
working to define the categorical spaces of normality and abnormality education itself becomes
generally defined.
What is forgotten in this essay’s act of remembrance, then, is the incrementalism of scientific
discovery, which because it always already presupposes revisionism can hide how and why
classificatory schemes are defended and revised. Also assumed by this process is insularity; that is,
scientific discoveries have no influence outside their own epistemic borders. Hence, for example,
Henry H. Goddard’s discovery of the moron in 1910 can be understood as a purely scientific
discovery that incrementally improved upon the previous discovery of Alfred Binet. Denied by such
reasoning is the fact that the moron classification did just define particular subjectivities but also
education generally. This was because education was both a location for identifying morons and a
procedure qua training for treating moronity. This essay asks that this view of incremental scientific
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discovery be forgotten and that the contingency of classificatory schemes be remembered instead as a
way of imagining an education that is different from the one these schemes readily provide.44 For more on the necessary and much needed
interplay between remembering and forgetting
within education see Sara Clark, “Remember-
ing in Order to Forget,” Education’s Histo-
ries, July 30, 2015, http://www.educationshisto-
ries.org/remembering-forget/.
Definitional fluidity and borderlinity enabled the science of classification to remain operative
throughout the Progressive Era and suggests a lesson about the educational use value of
indeterminacy, a lesson that is not about the accuracy of this or that classification but about
education’s need to classify difference as a way to define itself. The Progressive Era study of
feeble-mindedness, then, was not only about defining educational subjectivities but also about
establishing categorical spaces within education designed for bodies determined, for whatever reason,
to be abnormal. Understood as a process of constant self-definition, the history of Progressive Era
special education emerges as a way of thinking about education generally rather than only about the
history of a specialized field. This understanding follows James Trent’s history of feeble-mindedness
but also suggests that the desire to order difference was a necessary requirement of education’s
self-definition.55 James W. Trent, Jr., Inventing the Feeble Minded:
A History of Mental Retardation in the United States
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
The categorical spaces of Progressive Era special education emerged from the purposively
indeterminate spaces of intermediate and ungraded classes, spaces that allowed for easy ingress and
whose allure was the promise of eventual egress. The movement of students within these spaces
suggests that classificatory schemes were the producers, not the result, of a progressive educational
order of things.6 The history of Progressive Era special education is thus a history of an attempt to6 For more on this policy implication see James
Joseph Scheurich, “Policy Archaeology: A New
Policy Studies Methodology,” Journal of Education
Policy 9, no. 4 (1994): 297-316.
clarify difference through classificatory schemes designed to determine the allowed proximal distance
of special to “general” education.7 The parameters of this distance would be discussed and debated7 For a visual interpretation of this distance see
Figure 1. While Images 1 and 2 are perhaps stan-
dard ways of understanding the relationship be-
tween special and “general” education, this essay
argues for a mutually constitutive relationship as
illustrated in Image 3. As discussed in Part 2,
this critical perspective of special education has
methodological implications, which suggest that
special education is a way of better understand-
ing education’s “general” histories as well as policy
implications, which suggest that special education
policies in addition to classifying particular subjec-
tivities also work to define education generally.
within the pages of scientific journals like the Journal of Psycho-Asthenics and point to attempts to
validate the emerging field of special education. The science of classification qualified this emerging
field and its experts as uniquely capable of interpreting human difference and was the expertise that
Farrell sought in her request for a theory of special education.
This two-part conceptual inquiry into the theory of Progressive Era special education proceeds from
two perspectives. Part 1 takes up the classification of the laggard and the question of definitional
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fluidity, as well as education’s administrative tendency toward managing difference out of education.
Part 2 discusses the classification of the moron and the question of borderlinity, as well as
education’s tendency toward identifying difference within education.
Of Laggards
The laggard, like the dullard, was a classification that described students who did not advance at the
pace established by the modern progressive educational system or who might have fallen back from
earlier advancement. The laggard was especially important to Leonard Ayres’ study of educational
efficiency, in which he sought to quantify the numbers of students who were advancing through or
dropping out of education. The laggard reflects an administrative tendency within education
concerned with students exiting the formal education system. Ayres’ study statistically agreed with
Farrell’s clarification that students were being placed in special classes without a theory and sought
to counter such “opinion, guess work, and eloquence.”8
8 Leonard P. Ayres, Laggards in Our Schools: A
Study of Retardation and Elimination in City
School Systems (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1909), 219. Ayres’ statistical evidence bore out schools
with low rates of promotion and high rates of retardation and yet Ayres insisted that retardation
“expresse[d] a condition, not a process or explanation,” and was simply a way of referring to
students whose advancement was slower than average.99 Ibid., 9.
This classification quickly became part of what Joseph Tropea describes as the “backstage social
order” of Progressive Era special education, which required “actors’ tacit understandings and
interpretations of their organizational situations” as well as the “learning of backstage roles, rules,
and definitions.”10 This backstage social order helped educational leaders deal with the recurrent10 Joseph L. Tropea, “Bureaucratic Order and
Special Children: Urban Schools, 1890s-1940s,”
History of Education Quarterly 27, no. 1 (1987):
36.
problem of lagging students through transforming both the organization and rhetoric of education.
Educational leaders thus managed students into special classes where they did not count toward
general retardation rates. In addition to this administrative tactic, schools also issued work permits
that allowed students to be released from compulsory school attendance.11 Thus, despite Ayres’11 Ibid., 39-40.
insistence on the neutrality of the laggard, the condition of retardation still presented an
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administrative concern that lagging students would drain educational coffers and that their slow
advancement would retard the educational progress of all students.
Omnium Gatherum Settings
This administrative concern has organized special education since it emerged concomitantly with the
ideal of a common school system. Boston public schools, for example, were from their beginning
organized around “separate instructional settings for certain children whose public school attendance
was deemed desirable but whose presence in regular classrooms, for a variety of reasons, was not.”1212 Robert L. Osgood, “Undermining the Common
School Ideal: Intermediate Schools and Ungraded
Classes in Boston, 1838-1900,” History of Education
Quarterly 37, no. 4 (1997): 377. Emphasis added.
While intermediate and ungraded classes cast doubt about the commonness the common school
movement, Roberts v. Boston (1850) had already established legal precedent for not only excluding
black children from public education but for also engendering a separate and unequal logic that
continues to order special education.13
13 On this latter point, see, for example, Beth
Harry and Janette Klinger, Why are there so Many
Minority Students in Special Education?
Understanding Race & Disability in Schools (New
York: Teachers College Press, 2006).
The tension between increased school attendance and the
concern that not all children were suited for general education led the Boston School Committee to
create intermediate schools with the hope that special instruction might enable lagging students to
rejoin their common peers.
Despite their rhetoric of amelioration, intermediate schools, which would became ungraded classes
within public schools, functioned more like educational Botany Bays than transitional learning
spaces. The early history of common schools thus proves to be one of exclusion rather than cohesion,
which relied on students who failed to advance to drop out because absent this practice, intermediate
and ungraded classes risked becoming omnium gatherum settings.14 To preclude this possibility,14 For discussion of the terms Botany Bay and
omnium gatherum settings, see Osgood, 384, 394.
Ayres would argue that twelve was an appropriate age for when lagging students should fall out of
education; that is, of course, if these students had not already been passed along into the custodial
care of training institutions for the feeble-minded such as the Vineland Training School in New
Jersey. Up to twelve, however, ungraded and special classes allowed education to define itself as a
common enterprise, as something accessible to all children, despite the administration of separate
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educational worlds for education’s “odds and ends.”
The tension between intermediate and ungraded classes being spaces of indefinite detention and
spaces that would indefinitely collect miscellaneous students would not be resolved by Progressive
Era special education. This did not prevent experts like J. E. Wallace Wallin from attempting to
resolve this tension through clarifying special education’s classificatory schemes. Noting that “the
word special is generic and applies to eight or ten different kinds of special classes,” Wallin argued
that special classes should be reserved for “imbeciles, morons, borderline and seriously backward
cases,” and that the term ungraded classes “should be applied to classes in which children who are
retarded in one or more branches are given individual attention.”15 Despite Wallin’s attempt to15 J.E. Wallace Wallin, The Mental Health of the
School Child: The Psycho-Educational Clinic in Re-
lation to Child Welfare: Contributions to a New
Science of Orthophrenics and Orthosomatics (New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1914), 387.
cohere the definition of special education, its spaces remained porous, evident in Wallin’s
introduction of a third type of class, “the elementary industrial class,” which was designed for young
adolescents who “are appreciably backward or who are over age because of inability to cope with
regular curriculum, and who withal are industrially inclined.”16 That it was possible for students to16 Ibid.
be placed in these classes for reasons known only to experts like Wallin suggests how definitional
fluidity creates categorical spaces. Indeed, with the discovery of the moron, experts would
increasingly rely on this use value of indeterminacy as well as their ability to accurately interpret the
borderlands and borderlines of feeble-mindedness to validate their expertise.
The laggard testifies to how difference challenged the vision of a common school system, a system
which might be better understood as an administrative belief that while all children should be
included in general education, purposively indeterminate spaces for certain “special” children were
required. Managing students into the categorical spaces of special education was not the only way
Progressive Era special education relied on definitional fluidity. While the laggard could be readily
identified by slow progression through schooling, the moron was identified against their ability to
pass as normal and reflects an educational tendency toward identifying students within education.
Relying on a mental age of twelve as a determinacy of high grade functionality, Goddard asserted his
discovery of a previously absent classification of feeble-mindedness.
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The moron became a standard gradation for educational subjectivities that appeared normal, but
who were determined, for whatever reason, to be abnormal and, like the laggard, testify to
education’s reliance of the science of classification as a method of self-definition. Goddard’s discovery
also challenged the limits of education’s administrative tendency as falling out of education became
an insufficient condition for defining education. No longer would the general classification of
feeble-mindedness be sufficient; instead, the classification of the moron signals a desire to identify
specific subjectivities within education. In addition to reflecting definitional fluidity, the discovery of
the moron came to reflect education’s difficulty with borderlinity, which while similar to the omnium
gatherum settings of the common school movement, did not so much rely on students aging out of
education as being more accurately identified within education. While the moron was ultimately
determined to be an inaccurate classification, it still teaches an important lesson about education’s
self-definition. Goddard’s discovery was made possible by a perceived lack of classificatory accuracy,
from a borderland or borderline within the general classification of feeble-mindedness.
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Notes
Part 1 of this essay discussed the laggard, an educational subjectivity used to denote students who
did not progress through schooling at the pace determined by the modern progressive educational
system. Important to the story of the laggard was how definitional fluidity allowed the science of
classification to indefinitely collect and detain lagging students until the age of twelve when they
could fall out of education. The story of the moron relies on a similar use value of indeterminacy,
which is why its discovery in 1910 by Henry H. Goddard did not disprove the science of
classification, but only the inaccuracy of a previous classificatory scheme. Similarly, in discrediting
the moron, Lewis Terman of Stanford University would not argue against classification as such, but
only for the inability of this particular classification to accurately measure intelligence.17 This part
17 Originally revised in 1912, the Stanford revision
of the Binet test was finalized in 1916. See Lewis M.
Terman and H. G. Childs, “A Tentative Revision
and Extension of the Binet-Simon Measuring Scale
of Intelligence,” Journal of Educational Psychology
3, no. 3 (1912): 133-43; and Lewis M. Terman,
The Measurement of Intelligence (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1916).
of the essay takes up the classification of the moron and the question of borderlinity as well as
education’s tendency toward identifying difference within education. What, then, do borderlands
and borderlines reveal about how education defines itself?
Goddard, who also directed the Vineland Training School, discovered the moron by standardizing
the Binet intelligence test to include the concept of mental age. This standardization remained
prominent until Terman’s revision of the test. The Stanford-Binet revision claimed differentiation
from Goddard’s own revision of Binet’s test on the grounds that it was more scientifically accurate.
Specifically, Terman, along with fellow Stanford psychologist H. E. Knollin, argued that Goddard’s
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classificatory scheme was problematic because adults and those with a mental age of twelve or higher
tested as morons despite being located along the borderline of “average adult.”18 The specific18 Lewis M. Terman and H. E. Knollin, “Some
Problems Relating to the Detection of Borderline
Cases of Mental Deficiency,” Journal of Psycho-
Asthenics 20, nos. 1-2 (1915): 7.
problem with Goddard’s scheme was that it resulted in a three year disparity between mental and
chronological age, which Terman and Knollin corrected for by extending the age level being
measured from twelve to fourteen and measuring intelligence as a ratio between median chronological
and median mental age. Under Goddard’s standardization of the Binet intelligence test mental age
was understood only in terms of chronological age, thus, the problem of age disparity observed by
Terman and Knollin. This error was exponential as a difference of ten months at age five, which
became twenty months at age ten and two and half years and age fifteen. Terman and Knollin’s
corrected for this error by revising the Binet test so that median chronological age corresponded
with median intelligence (mental age). This revision introduced the classification of the average
adult, where for Goddard adult was an absolute demarcation of both chronological and mental age.
Greater accuracy, however, did not result in the reclassification of individuals previously identified as
morons. As discussed in Part 1, more accurate classifications do not result in individuals falling out
of categories due to the belief that those being measured essentially possess the quality being
measured. This belief was tested when enlisted men were given the Alpha and Beta intelligence tests
in 1917. Comparing these test results with Goddard’s revision of the Binet intelligence test revealed
that more than forty percent of enlisted men were morons.19 Goddard defended his classification19 Margret A. Winzer, From Integration to Inclu-
sion: A History of Special Education in the 20th
Century (Washington, D.C.: Gallaudet University
Press, 2002), 62-63.
against this result by arguing that moronity only applied to individuals who were already obviously
feeble-minded beyond other mental or physical signs and by insisting that because enlisted men
could manage their own affairs, they were not feeble-minded which meant that definitionally they
could not be morons. This defense relied upon a similar circular logic as introduced in Part 1 by
Miss E. E. Farrell, Inspector of Ungraded Classes of New York City.2020 E. E. Farrell, “Special Classes in the New York
City Schools,” Journal of Psycho-Asthenics, 13, nos.
1-4 (1908-09): 91.
For Goddard to prove the inexactness of the application of his classification, he had to rely on the
exactness of the classificatory scheme of feeble-mindedness, an argument that belied his insistence
for more classificatory accuracy within the general scheme of feeble-mindedness. This circular logic,
common to Progressive Era special education, is also evident in Goddard’s insistence that the
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feeble-mindedness of immigrants could be identified upon sight.21 It was as if the classification of the21 Henry H. Goddard, “The Binet Test in Relation
to Immigration,” Journal of Psycho-Asthenics 18,
no. 1 (1913): 105- 10. moron was proceeding without any theory and was being capriciously applied to individuals
determined, for whatever reason, to be abnormal. While this capriciousness should not be ignored,
neither should it detract from how the moron can help education better understand how it defines
itself. Indeed, how and why classificatory schemes are defended and revised is as important as the
schemes themselves. Thus, although Farrell insisted that New York City public schools were
proceeding with special education without a theory, perhaps the theory she was looking for, and
what special education continues to seek, was there all along; that is, a theory to generally explain
human difference within education. Farrell’s clarification, which began Part 1 of this essay, might be
better understood, then, as an attempt to justify an emerging specialized field of education uniquely
qualified to deal with the “many and serious problems in truancy and discipline” present in the
neighborhood surrounding New York City’s Public School 1.
Of Morons
Education’s tendency toward administering difference found a welcome partner in its tendency
toward identifying students within education. This tendency was especially important to Goddard,
who argued that extant gradations of feeble-mindedness had misclassified high functioning
individuals, who despite appearing normal, were in fact moronic. Goddard’s discovery of this missing
classification involved more than adding an additional grade to the existent staircase of mental limits
and cognitive plateaus, the very language of the classification itself was imbued with moral meaning.
Goddard argued that he derived the neologism moron from the Greek adjective moros, meaning
foolish.22 This did not explain why he chose this adjectival form when there was already a Greek22 Henry H. Goddard, “Four Hundred Feeble-
Minded Children Classified by the Binet Method,”
Journal of Psycho- Asthenics 15, no. 1 (1910): 27. noun, aphron, for a foolish person. Stephen Gelb suggests that Goddard likely chose moros because
of its linguistic proximity to moral, which allowed him, through etymological sleight of hand, to link
the nineteenth century discourses of moral insanity and moral imbecility with the emerging
technology of intelligence testing and to repackage “earlier assumptions about morality, intelligence,
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and the putative relationship between the two.”23
23 Steven A. Gelb, “‘Not Simply Bad and
Incorrigible’: Science, Morality, and Intellectual
Deficiency,” History of Education Quarterly 29, no.
3 (1989): 361.
The story of the moron, then, is not one of discovering a missed classification, but of definitionally
cohering morality and intelligence together as “all of the essential mental processes in such
proportion as to render the processor able to adapt himself to the environment.”24
24 Henry Herbert Goddard, Feeble-Mindedness:
Its Causes and Consequences (New York: The
MacMilllan Company, 1914), 572. The reception of
Goddard’s discovering was made possible by inconsistent nineteenth century understandings of
moral, which “was sometimes used to refer to all non-physical aspects of human life...at other times
it referred more specifically to the emotions, and it was also used in the more modern sense of
‘ethical.’”25
25 Gelb, 365. Understandings of morality
remained unsettled as America entered the
Progressive Era, an era which attempted to
reconcile through moral science the ethical
uncertainty that lingered from the Civil War. On
this moral/ethical fluidity see, for example, Drew
Gilpin Faust, Republic of Suffering: Death and the
American Civil War (New York: Vintage Books,
2008); and Louis Menand, textitThe Metaphysical
Club: A Story of Ideas in America (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001). The Preface of
Republic of Suffering, for instance, opens:
“Morality defines the human condition” (xi).
Faust then previews the work of Death in the
Civil War and the subsequent labor of survivors
to reconcile the shared suffering that gave human
life new meaning. Similarly, though with different
emphasis, Menand notes how the Civil War put
America’s idea of itself in flux. The Progressive
Era thus reflected an attempt “to develop a
culture to replace it [the antebellum milieu], to
find a set of ideas, and a way of thinking, that
could help people cope with the conditions of
modern life” (x). For Menand, progressive
thinkers such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, William
James, Charles S. Peirce, and William James were
the intellectual cartographers of the modern
terrain of ideas that emerged postbellum.
These fluid definitions facilitated the classification of moral insanity as a term of art
that connoted any form of moral subversion and which linked all degenerate types together while
allowing their symptoms to remain interchangeable. Moral insanity was discredited towards the end
of the nineteenth century and replaced by moral imbecility, which referred broadly to “persons whose
behavior was judged socially deviant, in both the presence and absence of other signs of mental or
physical disability.”26
26 Gelb, 369.
Intelligence was thus a matter of correct social adaptation and the exhibition of appropriate social
responsibility beyond other mental or physical signs, a distinction Goddard utilized to hypothesize
that because there were grades of responsibility and intelligence, responsibility varied according to
intelligence. Intelligence was thus not fixed, but something that was socially variable and which was
called into question by the modern progressive education system. Goddard’s hypothesis followed
Alfred Binet’s observations that French peasants do not possess, nor need they possess, the same
intelligence as Frenchmen living in Paris. Goddard would argue, however, that the relativity of
intelligence was preventing child studiers from seeing the real issue at stake: “[T]he persons who
constitute our social problems are of a type that in the past and under simpler environments have
seemed responsible and able to function normally;” however, Goddard continued, due to increased
social complexity, such persons “are no longer responsible for their actions.”27
27 Goddard, Feeble-Mindedness, 2.
Whereas previously
the moron might have been able to hide in rural settings, modernity presented unique challenges of
adaptation and responsibility that required a science of classification.28
28 Toward this end, Feeble-Mindedness included
327 genealogical cases studies, which used
Mendelian genetics to document the heredity of
feeble-mindedness and from this data hypothesize
its causes. Feeble-Mindedness thus continues
Goddard’s previous efforts to classify
feeble-mindedness using heredity; see Henry H.
Goddard, The Kallikak Family: A Case Study in
the Heredity of Feeble-Mindedness (New York:
MacMillian, 1912). Among the new challenges
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modernity presented to individuals was industrialization, but its processes of production also
provided the means by which adaptability could be measured (Fig. 2). Statistics, already used by
Ayers to argue for administrative efficiency, warned of an increase in feeble-mindedness within the
population based on an increase in the number of individuals being trained by institutions for the
feeble-minded.
With this looming threat in mind, Goddard called for a method that divided the population first
according to a baseline of intelligence above which there was a second line demarcating persons with
sufficient intelligence to function in simple environments from persons capable of functioning in more
complex environments. Below this baseline were persons unable to function in any environment. The
causal relation between responsibility and intelligence provided Goddard with a rubric for treatment:
“Knowing the grade of intelligence we may know the degree of responsibility. Knowing the degree of
responsibility we know how to treat.”29 This rubric was important because morons were “often29 Goddard, Feeble-Mindedness, 3.
normal looking with few or no obvious stigma or degeneration [and] frequently able to talk
fluently.”30 Goddard’s insistence on the inability of morons to function normally despite being able30 Ibid., 4-5.
to pass as such meant that moronity would have to be prevented eugenically rather than ameliorated
educationally because, following Goddard’s application of Mendelian genetics, “one can never be
sure that the feebleminded taint is not recessive and only waiting for a proper mating to appear.”3131 Ibid., 567.
Moronity was a genetic and hereditary threat to the population and its prosperity, capable of
producing what disability theorists Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell describe as a “subnormal
nation.”32 This was why identifying morons as well as demarcating the borderlands and borderlines32 Sharon L. Snyder and David T. Mitchell, Cul-
tural Locations of Disability (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2006): 69-99. of moronity became so important.
There is an insidiousness to the circular logic of Progressive Era special education: While social
adaptability was deemed genetic and hereditary and was the evaluative means by which an
individual could be classified as moronic, the moron had escaped previous classification by being able
to pass as normal, which definitionally is adaptation. This suggests that experts were less interested
with social adaptability as such and more concerned with evaluating whether one’s adaptation was
appropriate. Behavior, understood as genetic and hereditary, rather than as environmental, was
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evidentiary proof of one’s essential nature; and given the definitional fluidity of classificatory
schemes, there would always be enough behavioral evidence to identify individuals as already
abnormal. Thus while the classification of feeble-mindedness could be inexact, its designation could
never be arbitrary: “If it is arbitrary, man-made and ‘cerebral,’ how is it that it follows strict
biological law, a law as true for ‘homo sapiens’ as for other animals and for plants?”3333 Samuel C. Kohs, “The Borderlines of Mental
Deficiency,” Journal of Psycho-Asthenics 20, nos.
3-4 (1916): 91.
Borderlines and Borderlands
Goddard’s discovery of the moron allowed experts to determine what tasks children of different
mental ages should be expected to perform, but also introduced the problem of borderlinity; that is,
of determining whether a child was sufficiently performing those tasks deemed appropriate to their
mental age (Fig. 2).34 But Goddard’s discovery also opened up the science of classification to the34 Goddard, “Four Hundred Feeble-Minded Chil-
dren,” 31.
possibility that it was inexact and in need of revision. Prior to Goddard’s discovery, the etiology of
human difference could be understood through binary classifications, normal/idiot and then
normal/feeble-minded, under which all human variations could be explained. Thus, for example,
conditions as different as blindness, deafness, epilepsy, syphilis, and cretinism had the same
nosography despite presenting differently. This was because visible human differences were only
symptomatic expressions of a common feeble-mindedness; inversely, feeble-minded diagnoses led
experts to isolate physical abnormalities to empirically evidence their diagnoses. The moron, a
special type of feeble-mindedness, was a classification of human difference that proved the human
sciences (in this instance, psychology) could discover differences within human variability that had
gone previously unnoticed, use science to identify which variations were productive or degenerative,
and order institutions according to this baseline distinction.
Although there are few explicit references to borderlines or borderlands in Progressive Era scientific
journals such as the Journal of Psycho-Asthenics, borderlinity nonetheless permeated the Era’s
discussions of feeble-mindedness. In taking up the concept of borderlinity, this essay attends to how
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Figure 2. The industrial and Binet classifications at Vineland, NJ. Taken from Henry H. Goddard, “Four Hundred
Feeble-Minded Children Classified by the Binet Method,” Journal of Psycho-Asthenics, 15, no. 1 (1910): 31.
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experts explicitly discussed the borders of feeble-mindedness and argues that in attempting to draw
borders around and within feeble-mindedness, experts were at once reasoning the population into
classifications and populating the categorical spaces that resulted from these reasoned classifications
with subjectivities that were defined in enough abstractable detail so as to remain indeterminate. It
would be easy to discount the moron as bad science if it were not for the fact that the inexactness of
previous classifications, like the moron, continues to haunt special education.
As used in this essay, the concept of borderlinity as well as term borderlands refers to the space of
overlap between normality and abnormality. Borderland cases surfaced when individuals might be
classified as either normal or abnormal depending on the evaluative measure employed. Discerning
this space was the exclusive purview of experts who worked to varying degrees and sometimes in
contradictory directions to define the borderlinity of feeble-mindedness. The case studies which
defined the borderlinity of feeble-mindedness were, in turn, used to populate the borderlands of
feeble-mindedness. Case studies thus represent not only evidence of borderlands, they also
indeterminately defined the subjectivities that gave these categorical spaces meaning and purpose.
The borderlands of feeble- mindedness, however well conceptualized, could not exist unless
populated.
This essay acknowledges several similarities with the method of borderlands history.35 Like35 For a discussion of borderlands history see, for
example, “What is Borderlands History?” in Major
Problems in the History of North American Border-
lands, eds. Pekka Hämaläinen and Benjamin H.
Johnson (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2012): 1-40.
geographic borderlands, the borderlands of feeble-mindedness were also constructed from removed,
specialized locals (i.e., training institutions). Both the borderlands discussed here and those that
appear on maps reify the sovereign power of experts to draw lines of inclusion and exclusion that
accordingly determine allowed degrees of proximity and allowable movements of ingress and egress.
In acknowledging borderlands history, this essay also acknowledges a critical investment in
understanding borderlands as having active and contested histories rather than as being passive and
transcendental demarcations of separation. Thus, it is not the nation-state as already geographically
defined, but the recurrent use of borderlands as spatial and temporal means of national
self-definition that interests the borderlands historian. This method gains import for education
historians and policymakers due to the propensity of geographic borderlands and those of
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Figure 3. Four types of variability between feeble-mindedness and normality with regard to mental age (M. A.). Taken
from Samuel C. Kohs, “The Borderlines of Mental Deficiency,” Journal of Psycho-Asthenics 20, nos. 3-4 (1916): 95.
feeble-mindedness to be mutually reinforcing. Hence, for example, the disproportionate placement of
English Language Learners in special education, a present condition of exclusion that finds its
historical antecedent in the common school movement’s treatment of immigrants.3636 On this point, see Robert L. Osgood, “Un-
dermining the Common School Ideal: Intermedi-
ate Schools and Ungraded Classes in Boston, 1838-
1900,” History of Education Quarterly 37, no. 4
(1997).
In addition to specifying which tasks corresponded with what metal age, questions of borderlinity
also involved mental age itself; that is, whether the metal age of twelve was a borderline separating
normality and feeble-mindedness or the upper limit of a borderland of feeble-mindedness. Looking at
Figure 3, the reality of an overlapping borderland of feeble-mindedness can be compared with the
Education’s Histories | www.educationshistories.org 18 2016
Kearl | Of Laggards and Morons
idealism of correspondence and independence and the error of conjunction. Discussions of
borderlinity positioned conjunctional designations of feeble-mindedness, rather than the classification
itself, as arbitrary because there was not “a specific mental age, or a definite intelligence quotient, or
a particular mental coefficient or a specified per cent. [sic] as the point at which normality ends and
feeble-mindedness begins.”37 As progressive as this indeterminability may sound, the relaxing of37 Kohs, 96.
feeble-minded designations precipitated by Goddard’s discovery of the moron and its subsequent
revision by Terman did not lessen the imposition of classificatory schemes, but only increased the
demand to populate the borderlands being created by these schemes with indeterminately defined
subjectivities.
Efforts to populate the borderlands of abnormality were well under way prior to Goddard’s discovery
of the moron. A. C. Rodgers, for example, identified backward children, temperamentally abnormal
children, the juvenile insane, and moral imbeciles as “borderland cases,” an ad hoc designation
intended to be “comprehensive enough and to include all those cases of abnormal children which do
not properly classify with the typical feeble-minded,” but which should still be viewed from “the
standpoint of an institution for the feeble-minded.”38 Rodgers was concerned with how the four38 A.C. Rodgers, “Borderland Cases,” Journal of
Psycho-Asthenics 9, nos. 1-4 (1906-07): 19.
borderland cases he identified would interact with training institutions. The backward child was
most receptive to training and the moral imbecile was too governed by “selfish desire” to be
receptive and thus should be the purview of the courts. Rodgers’ identification of borderland cases is
not unique, nor was it uncommon for experts to describe subjectivities as ranging from receptive to
incorrigible. Rodgers’ borderland cases are also not particularly interesting in and of themselves
except for the fact that, like the moron, which was simply as a feeble-minded person with a mental
age between 8-12, they too were empty enough of meaning so as to be made meaningful by experts.3939 See Figure 2. Goddard would continue to
rely on this definition even after the Stanford-Binet
test replaced his test as the standard for measur-
ing intelligence; see Henry H. Goddard, “Feeble-
Mindedness: A Question of Definition,” Journal of
Psycho-Asthenics 33 (1928): 220.
What should be of interest to both education historians and policymakers is how indeterminate
definitions produce categorical spaces that education leaders and experts must then populate.
The populating of education’s categorical spaces is evident in the numerous case studies that fill the
pages of the Journal of Psycho-Asthenics, studies which were ostensibly meant to prove the accuracy
of this or that classification, but which materially extended into the world of education where they
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became placements, empirical pronouncements to justify why particular bodies inhabit particular
spaces. Definitional fluidity thus produced categorical spaces that must be populated if the
definitions that justified the existence of these spaces were to remain meaningful. Definitional
fluidity worked in the other direction as well: Once populated with bodies, education’s categorical
spaces produced definitions of human difference reflective of those particular bodies. While there was
a risk that this circular process would result in misclassifying the normal as feeble-minded, this risk
was significantly less than misclassifying the feeble-minded as normal.
Terman and Knollin, for example, weighed the various risks involved in misclassifying children who
were slightly less intelligent as slightly above average, moderately superior as very superior, or
high-grade imbecile as low-grade moron and determined that the real danger was incorrectly
identifying the borderline of intelligence that separated the feeble-minded from the average adult.4040 Terman and Knollin, 3.
Samuel Kohs, a psychologist at the Chicago House of Corrections, explains this danger: “if
‘feeble-mindedness’ were a mere name, just a loose tag, arbitrarily placed upon certain backward
individuals, then a thorough, intensive treatment ought to bring them out of that condition. A single
authentic case in which that has been accomplished is yet to be presented.”4141 Kohs, 92.
Not correctly identifying the permanent taint of feeble-mindedness, especially in its moronic form,
would always outweigh the risk of incorrectly identifying the normal as feeble-minded. Importantly,
borderlands made the latter risk less likely because they could accommodate more bodies either until
they could be be classified or until a new classification could be discovered. Borderlands also reduced
the risk of misclassification because once a body inhabited the borderland of feeble-mindedness, it
was likely their behavior would be interpreted as non-adaptable and thus as empirical evidence of
feeble-mindedness. In this way, classificatory science and the categorical spaces this science produced
echoed, though with more exacting inflection, the temporal collection and detainment of lagging
subjectivities within ominum gatherum settings.
The moron raises the stakes of how to understand the Progressive Era theory of special education.
Do more diagnostic techniques and better evaluative technologies help to identify those individuals
Education’s Histories | www.educationshistories.org 20 2016
Kearl | Of Laggards and Morons
who previously escaped classification; or do these techniques and technologies produce the empirical
evidence they are measuring? This essay has been less interested in answering this constructivist
question and more concerned with how education is able to use classifications as an indeterminant
means of self-definition because classifications are empty of enough meaning to be made meaningful.
It was because the moron classification meant something specific that it could be applied to
individuals; however, it was also the case that the application of this classification required it to
adapt to those individuals it classified.
Education policies that continue to track students into differentiated placements designed around the
empirical evidence that tracking itself produces continue to participate in the circular logic of
Progressive Era special education through a fusing of education’s administrative and identificatory
tendencies that enables education leaders to utilize the abstractable data of disability labels to
justify seemingly race, class, and gender neutral placements.42 Rather than evaluating the definitions42 Tracking was ruled a violation of Fifth Amend-
ment’s Due Process clause by the Court of Ap-
peals in Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.Supp. 401 (DDC
1967). While Judge James Skelly Wright ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs and thus against tracking,
the decision only attended to the effects of track-
ing and left unanswered the question of whether
tracking based on race was intentional. Hobson
remains problematic due to its refusal to interro-
gate the ways indeterminate definitions of human
difference and abstractable disability labels justify
tracking by obfuscating the intent behind these jus-
tifications. As recently as 2014, the Supreme Court
used the standard of discriminatory intent to deny
Allston v. Lower Merion School District, 135 S.Ct.
1738 (2015) a Writ of Certiorari. Citing the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
maintained that statistical evidence of discrimina-
tion was not, in and of itself, probative; rather, the
Court agreed that LMSD had individually assessed
and satisfied students’ educational differences.
that defined the borderland space of Progressive Era special education for accuracy, this essay has
used the laggard and moron as a way of conceptualizing how education defines itself. This essay has
also conceptualized special education not along its borderland as questions of inclusion, free and
appropriate, or least restrictive environment might do, but upon the categorical spaces education
constructs and maintains through its histories and policies.
These spaces are both producers of and are produced by education’s definition of itself. Reading
Figure 1 (Part 1) and Figure 3 (above) together, the correspondence and independence images of the
relationship between normality and feeble-mindedness resemble the image of special education as a
specialized field within “general” education; and the overlapping and conjunction images resemble
the image of special and “general” education as a Venn diagram. The former resemblance relies on
special and “general” education being either non-interactive (correspondence) or on the possibility of
transitioning from special to “general” education (independence). The latter resemblance relies on
special and “general” education overlapping, as is the case with inclusion, or adjoining (conjunction),
as is the case with students being located in separate educational institutions (i.e., custodial care).
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While a larger overlap may result in greater inclusion, it also produces the need to populate the
resulting borderland with indeterminately defined subjectivities. Furthermore, given the fluidity of
these definitions, borderlands will shrink or grow as new definitions of human difference are
discovered. It is for this reason that this essay has advocated for conceptualizing special education as
not distinct from “general” education because it is through this understanding that education can
better discuss how it uses the categorical spaces of normality and abnormality to define itself. This
self-definition is evident whenever education policies articulate human difference. It is not, therefore,
only subjectivities that are defined through policies such as the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975 (EHA), but education itself. While the EHA codified specific learning disability
(SLD) into law, the indeterminacy of this label has allowed education to use SLD as a means of
self-definition through ad hoc determinations of how well students read, write, or do math.4343 The Education for All Handicapped Children
Act defined children with a specific learning dis-
ability has having “a disorder in one or more of the
basic psychological processes,” which “manifest it-
self in an imperfect ability to listen, think, speak,
read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations.”
This definition excluded children who have “learn-
ing problems which are primarily the result of vi-
sual, hearing, or motor handicaps, or mental retar-
dation, or emotional disturbance, or environmen-
tal, cultural, or economic disadvantage.” Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-142, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1975), 22.
These largely subjective determinations do not constitute tracking per se because they are
non-intentional evaluations of specific, objective learning criteria. This specificity should give both
education historians and policymakers pause first because it uses the circular logic of classificatory
science to congeal a definition of education that includes all students by excluding certain students.44
44 Specifically, SLD has historically been used to
secure educational resources and accommodations
for white and affluent students while simultane-
ously being used to segregate students of color and
those living in poverty. See Christine E. Sleeter,
“Why is there Learning Disabilities? A Critical
Analysis of the Birth of the Field in Its Context,”
in The Formation of School Subjects: The Struggle
for Creating an American Institution, ed. Thomas
S. Popkewitz (New York: The Falmer Press, 1987):
210-37; and Ruth Colker, Disabled Education: A
Critical Analysis of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (New York: New York University
Press, 2013): 1-9.
Secondly, the SLD label continues to participate in the practice of evaluating intelligence (here,
effectively learning to read, write, and do math) according to chronological age. What results is a
definition of education made possible by the power to know subjectivities through the use of
indeterminate definitions and borderlinity. This, then, was the theory of Progressive Era special
education being called for by Ferrell and other experts. As argued here, this theory was there all
along and was justified by a circular logic that defined education according to its administrative and
identifying tendencies. For education to define itself as something other than what its classificatory
schemes readily provide will require at times forgetting the incrementalism of scientific discovery in
favor of remembering what these discoveries are contingent upon, a general explanation of human
difference within education.
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